Some well-meaning people ask: ‘Where have all the brilliant and decent officers gone?’ During the Marcos era, there was a perception that the domination of senior positions in the Armed Forces of the Philippines by non-graduates of the Philippine Military Academy was intentional on the part of the commander-in-chief. It was believed that Marcos feared the integrity of the Peemayers which was a hindrance to his unconstitutional one-man rule. Marcos valued blind loyalty over integrity and competence.
As the corps commander of our Citizens Army Training in 1977, I recall that the AFP chief of staff and all major service commanders were non-PMA graduates, and all were extended preventing younger Peemayers from assuming their top posts. They were Romeo Espino (CSAFP), Josephus Ramas (CGPA), Simeon Alejandro (FOIC PN), Vicente Piccio (CG, PAF), and Fidel Ramos (CPC). By the time I graduated from West Point in 1983, the top leaders of the AFP were still these same officers with the exception of Fabian Ver who had succeeded Espino.
It was only after the ouster of Marcos by the EDSA Revolution of 1986 that PMA alumni were able to assume the top leadership posts in the AFP. And it only seemed apt as the competent leaders of character from the PMA were seen as more loyal to the people they served than to the commander-in-chief they followed. Much have happened since then. We recall that not too long after Corazon Aquino assumed power in February 1986, segments of the military once more turned against their commander-in-chief. The rebellions during the Cory years were so unlike the EDSA uprising.
If the 1986 revolution emancipated an entire nation from the clutches of a deluded dictator, the succeeding rebellions cared not about popular mandates more than installing their preferred political leader. This factoid may seem a bit unlike the military’s traditional values. However, on closer look, the coup attempts launched by the military actually coincided with what was primordial in the psyche of soldiers. And that is accomplishment of the mission. In the midst of a protracted counterinsurgency war, traditional military thinking favored political leaders who respected their mindset in terms of sustaining the hard-earned gains against state enemies.
Corazon Aquino was not seen by many in the military as an ally more than Juan Ponce Enrile or even Fidel Ramos. The military then had trouble aligning itself with a leader who was perceived to be friendly with the communists, her being elected notwithstanding. It was only the new chief of staff, Ramos, who pacified the mainstream AFP from not joining the rebellion which would have altered the domestic balance of power more than EDSA did. Had Ramos not succeeded, the country would have turned into a Myanmar! It must be recalled that although the military turned against Marcos in the end, it supported him early on. Marcos’ focus on the local communists as the enemy resonated well with the military which clearly saw safeguarding the people from communism as a most worthwhile reason for being. How can it not be? When communism is anti-Christianity and anti-democracy, the very cultural and political values of Filipinos.
Communism was clearly anti-Filipino. Therefore, it was a clear mission for the AFP. But when Marcos perpetuated himself in office and abused his power becoming the number one recruiter to communism, the military turned against its master. Marcos had become the enemy more than the communists. But the AFP had hoped for a new leader who possessed the same zeal as Marcos when it came to accomplishing its mission. When Cory turned out to not be that person, the military turned against her, too. Then EDSA II happened in early 2001.
As in 1986, the military turned against its leader because Joseph Estrada had become the nation’s enemy by his dysfunctional behavior as a national leader. And the military intervened because the rule of law did not work. Estrada had been impeached in truthful reality, but that verdict was hijacked preventing the rule of law and prompting the military to intervene and help bring back stability and peace to the balance of power. Under Angelo Reyes then, the military reasserted its mission as the protector of the people and the state. Again, the mission was primordial in the mindset of the AFP led by its officer corps. Then the so-called ‘military adventurism’ was outlawed. This is such a paradox and somewhat ironic. Each time the military does something for good governance, accomplishing its mission to protect the people and the state, its positive participation is outlawed.
The same thing happened shortly after EDSA ‘86. The Philippine Constabulary, which had contributed so well to the positive regime change away from dictatorship and towards democracy, was constitutionally dissolved. EDSA I and II would not have happened without military adventurism. Call it what you want, but if you ask someone who is a rebel once like me, military rebellions have worked for this nation against abusive national leaders. In fact, EDSA I and II were so successful that the erring Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo pampered the military so she would not be forcibly removed by it. The law penalizing military rebellion makes sense only if there is truly the rule of law operating in our country especially in the exercises of impeachment and national elections balancing out domestic power.
What has been the resultant effect of outlawing military rebellion in a culture of corruption, bureaucratic mediocrity and ambiguity, dualism, and political patronage? There is no longer any balance of power. For in a soft state like the Philippines, the move has only managed to shift and consolidate national power once again in the commander-in-chief. In a perfect world, it would work. But the world, especially the Philippines, is very far from perfect.
The military mindset, which is accomplishment of the mission dictated by a commander-in-chief, is the only reason for being left for an autocratic organization that is the military. Rightly or wrongly. Let me explain. A review of military history and hierarchy is necessary. In the early days of humanity, fathers led their families and clans in actual defensive combat against enemies who threatened their survival. When populations grew, entire clans and neighboring tribes of like interests bonded together against enemies still led by local leaders among them. Tribes became nations. Nations were kingdoms, as they were literally led by kings leading them in battle. Nations became countries as territories became permanent.
When peace became longer than the periods of war, standing armies were maintained. Smaller in number but the members did soldiering as a way of life. These became the professional soldiers or regular army. The rest went home to build entire societies protected by the small standing army which also safeguarded their territory. The sustainment of the common good or interest, common to both people and army, was the recurrent mission especially by the latter.
Men of the profession of arms live by a moral code that is superior to all other men. Because they are authorized by law to kill other human beings under the right circumstances, like just, defensive wars. World Wars I and II are classic examples. To maintain such order in the ranks, men under arms live by a chivalric code of honor which works for them well in battle but also translates through other areas of their lives.
For instance, honorable men in arms do not kill innocent lives especially those of helpless men, women, and children. They serve honorably, not dishonorably especially avoiding the corruption that dishonors the uniform and compromises successful accomplishment of the mission. They prefer to die with honor, respect, and dignity than die along the road to perdition. This sense of honor, written in sacrificial blood as that of the Lamb, is what keeps the honorable soldier above his civilian commander-in-chief who has never led him in actual combat. That this disconnect between the overall leader and the officer corps continues to happen nevertheless does not mean that this disconnect is not there. Because it is definitely there as sure as day.
Today, it is vastly different. Although the basic principles of command and structure continue, albeit in another form. For the commander-in-chief may no longer be one of the members of the regular standing army. But this leader, given power and jurisdiction over the army, commands the members who are obliged to obey. Today, that power given is by virtue of popular elections conducted in democracies where majority choice wins. Thus, Carl von Clausewitz came to define war as politics by other means. To once professional soldiers like me, there really is a dysfunction to this. For the values of the lethal modern army are far from that of politicians who are unlike them and who represent people who know nothing about warfare.
The point I am trying to make is that, there is such a serious disconnect between civilian leaders and military professionals that the relationship between them is bound to result in utter failure. If you do not believe me, look around you and review this history I refer to. Soldier-leaders have made benevolent political leaders because they have gone through the horrors of war. But not civilians who have never served. Because the missions are different in the eyes of these role players. The civilian leader always gets the upper hand at the cost of lives better left to the hands of men who know about dying.
What drives the officer corps? Where are all the decent and competent officers? Mission drives the officer corps. A worthwhile mission that convinces even them who are bound to execute them. If the AFP today is still going after the local communists, it is because that is a mission that it has always had. Even I spent an entire career in the military fighting the local communists.
The war is a protracted one. It is still ongoing because the enemy has not surrendered. It continues to fight the government and hopes to overthrow it in favor of a communist state in its place. Why is China no longer an enemy even if it, too, is communist and a larger threat? The pivot to China away from long-time ally the US was a political decision by the commander-in-chief, one that is apparently tolerated by the domestic balance of power. Some may say that there is a disconnect between what was and is now relative to the pivot. This is answered by my earlier statements pointing to how power is entrusted to an elected leader and the policy choices he makes thereafter in exercise of his mandate. If there is incongruence to constitutional goals which are that of a nation, the constitutional balance of power sees to that.
As far as the military is concerned, it has been check-mated by law in terms of, and due in part to, the political participation it had manifested in the past. And if there is misalignment between political leader values and the mission type preferences of the military officer corps, this too has been neutralized by constitutional provisions subordinating the professional standing army to whoever is commander-in-chief. Whatever happened to the competent and decent officers? Why aren’t their voices heard? There was a time especially in the ‘80s and the ‘90s when people saw brilliant officers who refused to follow illegal orders even from the commander-in-chief or powerful oligarchs. Where are they now? Well, I say to this that they are still very much around. But that the prevailing law and order prevents them from becoming visible in their roles and duties.
Every subordinate in position of power, however brilliant, is only as good as his ultimate superior. Subordinates reflect their superiors and are not at liberty to act independently of their superiors. It is the mission that moves the officer corps. I would like to believe that such mission continues to be the main underlying factor behind every commissioned officer’s waking hour. And that the mission remains the same: To protect the people and the state from enemies, foreign and domestic.
Unlike the Marcos regime, the Duterte administration is full of graduates of the Philippine Military Academy. Not only in the armed forces and police force but the entire government. Active-duty or retired, alumni whose alma mater values are courage, integrity, and loyalty to country lead the Duterte government. And the president does not fear appointing Peemayers to his team. Which is a good sign because this means he wants leaders of character and competence leading the fight against poverty, disease like the ongoing pandemic, territorial occupation in the West Philippine Sea, local insurgency, environmental degradation, and human rights violations.
Imbued with their high sense of values and command responsibility, Peemayers are still looked up to and expected to deliver. Their mission remains the same and inviolate: Protect the people. Protect the state. From all threats, foreign or domestic. The ball is now in their court. More than ever.
